Road Privatization: Explaining the Trend, Assessing the Facts, and Protecting the Public
9/18/2007
Executive Summary
Privatization
of toll roads is a growing trend. During 2007, sixteen states had some
privatized road project formally proposed or underway. In the last two years Indiana
and Chicago signed multi-billion dollar private concession deals for public roads
for 75 years and 99 years respectively. As a result of these deals, toll rates
on these roads will increase steadily and revenues will be paid to private
company shareholders rather than to the public budget.
Encouraged
by the enormous anticipated profits that private road operators will reap from
these deals, Wall Street investors and high-priced consulting firms have
promoted similar deals to other states and local governments. Although offering
a short-term infusion of cash, privatization of existing toll roads harms the
long-term public interest. It relinquishes important public control over
transportation policy while failing to deliver the value comparable to the
tolls that the public will be forced to pay over the life of the deal.
Proposed
deals to construct new roads or bridges that would be privately operated are a
more complicated matter. There may be instances where private companies can
deliver services that the public sector currently lacks and can not efficiently
create. However, private deals for new construction should also follow the
principles outlined below to adequately protect the public interest. Any
potential advantages of privately construction should be weighed against the
disadvantages of private financing and control.
Governments
have a long history of outsourcing service delivery on public thoroughfares.
Private companies, for instance, operate gas stations and food service at
public rest stops. But the public interest is best served by outsourcing only those
functions where public capacity is lacking and where continual competition exists
for privately provided service.
In
general, privatization makes sense only for activities where the private sector
has a clear comparative advantage over public provision of those same services.
The common characteristics of road privatization deals are that they enlist a
private intermediary to borrow large sums of money backed by a schedule to
collect multiple decades of steadily increasing toll rates. Private proposals
should thus be judged according to the relative costs and benefits of enlisting
this intermediary to borrow and to hike tolls. Governments can borrow upfront sums
at substantially lower cost than can private companies. Government is also more
democratically accountable than private companies when it comes to setting
tolls. (In fact, according to a chorus of investment analysts, a chief contribution
of the private intermediary is precisely that it can diminish public
accountability for future toll hikes.) Thus toll road concessions are a bad
idea precisely because they outsource activities where the private sector is
less capable of serving the public.
In
addition to an inability to ensure that the public will receive the full value for
its future toll revenues, privatization of toll roads entails a number of
additional problems. Over the long-term, these may be of even more serious
concern:
•
Loss of public control of transportation policy due to a fragmented road network,
and an inability to prevent toll traffic from being diverted to local communities,
or to change traffic patterns on toll roads without paying additional
compensation to road operators.
•
An inability to ensure fair or effective privatization contracts due to leases that
last for multiple generations and therefore can not fully anticipate future
public needs.
•
The upfront privatization payoff is a short-term budget fix that does not address
long-term budget problems and requires drivers and taxpayers to pay more over
the long term.
For
both existing toll roads and new construction, the safeguards to protect the
public interest against bad privatization deals can be expressed in seven basic
principles:
•
Public control retained
over decisions about transportation planning and management;
•
Fair value guaranteed
so future toll revenues won’t be sold off at a discount;
•
No deal longer than 30 years
because of uncertainty over future conditions and because the risks of a bad deal
grow exponentially over time;
•
State-of-the-art maintenance and safety standards instead
of statewide minimums;
•
Complete transparency to ensure proper
process;
•
Full accountability in which
the Legislature must approve the terms of a final deal, not just approve that a
deal be negotiated; and
•
No budget gimmicks because a deal
must make long-term budgetary sense, not just help in the short term.
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